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Successorship Clauses in Collective Bargaining 
Agreements 
In structuring the sale of a business, counsel for the seller and 
the buyer must be sensitive to potential labor law complications. 
The tax, antitrust, and corporate problems generated by an ac- 
quisition or merger can so fully occupy an attorney's time and 
attention that it is "easy to overlook labor problems that can 
result from such  transaction^."^ To be thorough, counsel should 
determine whether any unexpired collective bargaining agree- 
ment of the seller (predecessor) contains a successorship clause 
and, if so, under what circumstances the clause is enforceable to 
bind the buyer (successor) to the terms of the existing agree- 
ment .2 
This Comment discusses the effect of successorship clauses 
on the parties to the sale of a business. The applicability and 
enforceability of these clauses against successor employers will be 
viewed in light of a successorship doctrine that Supreme Court 
Justices have admitted is already "'shrouded in somewhat im- 
pressionist appro ache^."'^ The applicability of successorship 
clauses to predecessor employers will be analyzed together with 
the remedies available to enforce the clause against a predecessor 
employer's breach. 
While a plethora of articles have been published on labor law 
successorship in general,' the impact of successorship clauses has 
been rarely and only briefly mentioned5 despite the fact that such 
clauses are fairly common in collective bargaining agreements? 
1. Coughlin & Van de Kerckhove, Labor Problems in Mergers and Acquisitions, WIS. 
B. BULL., Oct. 1974, a t  29. 
2. See id. a t  42 app. (Checklist, Acquisitions and Mergers, Labor Assets). 
3. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 US. 272, 299 (1972) (Rehnquist, 
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, joined by Burger, C.J., Brennan & Powell, JJ.) 
(quoting Machinists Dist. Lodge 94 v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1135,1139 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Leven- 
thal, J., concurring)). 
4. See 4 T. KHEEL, LABOR LAW 4 17.01 11.33 (1978) (listing over 50 articles on the 
subject). 
5. See Severson & Willcoxon, Successorship Under Howard Johnson: Short Order 
Justice For Employees, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 838-39 (1976); Slicker, A Reconsideration 
of the Doctrine of Employer Successorship-A Step Toward a Rational Approach, 57 
MINN. L. RE\r. 1051, 1076-78 (1973). 
6. In a Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) study in 1975,22% of all collective bargain- 
ing agreements sampled contained a successorship clause. The "clauses were more com- 
mon in nonmanufacturing (31 percent) than in manufacturing (17 percent) contracts." In 
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The principles of law in this area are found primarily in decisions 
by federal courts, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 
and arbitrators of labor disputes-all of whom have had to pro- 
ceed without the aid of statutory guidance.' These bodies have 
attempted to balance the equities in labor law successorshipn by 
asking (1) whether it is equitable to bind a successor to the terms 
of a labor contract entered into by other parties simply because 
a successorship clause exists, and (2) whether it is just for a 
predecessor to ignore a successorship clause by selling its business 
without requiring assumption of an unexpired collective bargain- 
ing agreement. 
A. Types of Successorship Clauses 
The specific wording of a successorship clause may take one 
of two general approaches. The clause can be aimed directly a t  
successors: "The provisions of this Agreement shall be binding 
upon the Company and its successors and assigns by merger, 
consolidation or other~ise."~ Or it may be more indirect and pro- 
vide: 
The Company agrees that, if at any time during the life of this 
Agreement, it were to sell, lease, transfer or otherwise dispose 
of all or substantially all of its business, it will require the suc- 
cessor to its interest to assume and agree to be bound by all the 
terms and provisions of this Agreement so long as the successor 
continues operations on the Company's  premise^.'^ 
Other successorship clauses are usually variations or a combina- 
tion of these two approaches. l1 
The applicability and enforceability of a successorship clause 
against a successor or predecessor employer in a specific case, 
however, does not seem to turn on the wording of the particular 
clause. Either of the above approaches is sufficient to require 
- - 
three industries, "[mlore than half of the contracts [had] successorship clauses: trans- 
portation (61 percent), utilities (60 percent), and services (53 percent)." BNA, BASIC 
P A ~ R N S  IN UNION CONTRACTS 8 (8th ed. 1975). 
7. See Slicker, supra note 5, at 1053. 
8. See generally Note, The Bargaining Obligatio& of Successor E m b e r s ,  88-HARV. 
L. REV. 759, 759-60 (1975). 
9. 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING EGOTIATIONS & CONT. (BNA) 70:182 (1976) (Raytheon 
Co. and Electrical Workers (IBEW)). 
10. Id. (Park Drop Forge Div. and Boilermakers). 
11. See id. at 70:181-82 (National Master Freight Agreement and Teamsters). 
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careful consideration of the duties possibly imposed by a succes- 
sorship clause. Mere reference in the recitals of a collective bar- 
gaining agreement to "successors and assigns," however, may not 
constitute a successorship clause because the active language 
imposing a duty is absent.12 
A milder type of successorship clause attempts to impose on 
a successor employer only the duty to recognize and bargain with 
the predecessor's union, not the duty to abide the substantive 
terms of the contract.13 However, since the Supreme Court has 
held that these successorship clauses are implied in every collec- 
tive bargaining agreement and are enforceable if the majority of 
the successor employer's work force consists of employees of the 
predecessor,14 they are outside the scope of this Comment. 
The language the NLRB regularly inserts in its unfair labor 
practice awards to make an award binding on the offending em- 
ployer, "its officers, agents, successors and assigns"15 demon- 
strates another type of successorship clause extraneous to the 
coverage of this Comment. These successorship clauses are en- 
forceable against successors who have knowledge of a predeces- 
sor's unfair practice,16 but will usually be binding only on a suc- 
12. In re Rattray & Co., 35 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 676, 679 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960). 
13. See, e.g., International In-Flight Catering Co. v. National Mediation Bd., 555 
F.2d 712, 715 (9th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. United Indus. Workers of the Seafarers Int'l 
Union, 422 F.2d 59, 62 (5th Cir. 1970); Reynolds v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 
74 Lab. Cas. 16,750, 16,750 (M.D.N.C. 1973); Long Island R.R. v. System Fed'n No. 156, 
53 Lab. Cas. 16,429, 16,431 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 368 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1966). 
14. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972). 
15. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 170 (1973). Some have argued 
that successorship clauses in NLRB awards should be enforceable regardless of the en- 
forceability of other types of successonhip clauses to deny the successor the fruits of a 
predecessor's unfair labor practice. 4 J. JENKINS, LABOR LAW 218 (Supp. 1974). Also, it is 
not a private party inserting the successorship clause in unfair labor practice awards, but 
a governmental body " 'obligated to effectuate the policies of the [National Labor Rela- 
tions] Act.' " 414 U.S. at 177 (quoting Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 285 
(1956)). 
16. Golden State ~ o t t l i n ~  Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 170 (1973). The NLRB had 
vacillated on the issue for many years. See Perrna Vinyl Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 968 (1967) 
(holding a successor with notice liable for an unfair labor practice of the predecessor), 
enforced sub nom. United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 
1968); Symns Grocer Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 346 (1954) (successor not liable); Alexander Mil- 
burn Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 747 (1947) (successor liable); South Carolina Granite Co., 58 
N.L.R.B. 1448 (1944) (successor liable for own but not predecessor's unfair labor prac- 
tices), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Blair Quarries, Inc., 152 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1945). The 
Supreme Court held that the broad remedial powers of the NLRB under 6 10(c) of the 
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976), were sufficient to validate the 
successorship clause in the Board's order in Golden State Bottling. 414 U.S. at 176-77. 
See Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 14 (1945); NLRB v. Ozark Hardwood Co., 
282 F.2d 1 ,5  (8th Cir. 1960). The Court also held that enforcement of the NLRB's succes- 
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cessor who has purchased the predecessor's going business1' and 
has retained essentially the same work force.18 However, even a 
wholesale takeover with identical operations and adoption of the 
predecessor's labor contract will not bind a successor to an unfair 
practice award against the predecessor if the successor has no 
notice. lg 
B. Reasons Successorship Clauses Exist 
During collective bargaining, the union typically demands a 
successorship clause and the employer generally opposes it.2u A 
union will push for a successorship clause to give its members a 
greater sense of job security,21 especially when the collective bar- 
gaining agreement is considered to be favorable to employees. 
While it is theoretically possible for a successorship clause to 
enhance the sale value of a business covered by a pro-employer 
labor contract,22 most cases indicate that the existence of a suc- 
cessorship clause will discourage buyers.23 
Since the NLRB has held that it constitutes a mandatory 
subject of bargaining,24 an employer must seriously consider a 
union's demand for a successorship clause. If the employer does 
not contemplate selling the business during the term of the labor 
agreement or recognizes the clause's dubious enforceability, there 
may be little incentive to actively oppose inclusion of a successor- 
ship clause." However, as long as a successorship clause is argua- 
sorship clause would not contravene the policy underlying Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 414 U.S. at 180. 
17. See Slicker, supra note 5, at 1073. This accords with the necessarily narrow 
definition of successor for successorship clauses in collective bargaining agreements. See 
text accompanying notes 32-39, 109-16 infra. 
18. See UAW v. NLRB, 442 F.2d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 1971). 
19. UAW Local 6 v. Saga Foods, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 1247, 1253-54 (N.D. Ill. 1976). 
20. Some employers have even bargained for an anti-successorship clause prohibiting 
a carryover of seniority if a successor buys the company. E.g., Sidney Wanzer & Sons v. 
Teamsters Local 754,46 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 426 (1966) (Dolnick, Arb.); cf. Greengate 
Mall, Inc., 209 N.L.R.B. 37 (1974) (provision in contract to sell business that successor 
not hire predecessor's employees). 
21. See 32 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 170, 173 (1954). 
22. Cf. id. (employer's advantage to be able to transfer labor agreement to successor 
and hold the union bound to it). 
23. E.g., Teamsters Local 5 v. Pharmacies, Inc., 84 L.R.R.M. 2453 (M.D. La. 1973). 
See also text accompanying notes 145-51 infra. - ---- - - 
24. UMW (Lone Star Steel Co.), 231 N.L.R.B. 573 (1977). 
25. The same NLRB decision that held successorship clauses to be a mandatory 
subject of bargaining explicitly reserved "the issues of whether a union may lawfully act 
to compel compliance with such a provision or whether a successor employer would be 
bound by the terms of such an agreement." Id. at 575 n.13. 
SUCCESSORSHIP CLAUSES 
bly enforceable, predecessors will have an incentive to make 
adoption of the labor contract a condition of sale. Similarly, suc- 
cessors may comply voluntarily with a successorship clause or 
adopt a similar agreement in order to avoid disruption of their 
new businesses. In Keeley v .  Refiners Transport & Terminal 
Corp., 26 for example, the existence of a successorship clause was 
the specific reason given for "retain[ing] all past seniority and 
benefits accrued" under the predecessor's collective bargaining 
agreement .27 
Successorship clauses, unfortunately, have been abused. In 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University v.  Ross Aviation, Inc? 
the successor was badgered by the predecessor and the union 
about the predecessor's successorship clause after the successor 
had won a service contract by underbidding the predecessor. The 
clause was clearly unenforceable in this case,19 but the persistent 
bad faith harassment led to the successor's default on the service 
contract, permitting the predecessor to recover the contract. After 
four years of litigation, the successor finally obtained a judgment 
for treble damages against the predecessor and the union for their 
miscond~ct .~~  A better understanding of the enforceability of suc- 
cessorship clauses should prevent such occurrences in the future. 
In. EFFECT ON SUCCESSOR EMPLOYERS 
By express language most successorship clauses purport to 
bind the successor or purchaser of a business to the unexpired 
collective bargaining agreement of the predecessor. If a successor- 
ship clause is both applicable to and enforceable against a partic- 
ular successor, all of the predecessor's employees would need to 
be retained and compensated by the successor as set forth in the 
collective bargaining agreement for the full term of the agree- 
ment. The degree to which successorship clauses are enforceable 
against successor employers seems to depend primarily on the 
"successorship doctrineM-a doctrine developed in successorship 
cases involving agreements not containing successorship 
clauses .31 
26. 60 Lab. Cas. 16,722 (E.D. Mich. 1969). 
27. Id. at 16,724. 
28. 504 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974). 
29. See Emerald Maintenance, Inc. v. NLRB, 464 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1972) (discussed 
in text accompanying notes 46-48 infra). 
30. The court found that the predecessor employer and its union had violated 9 1 of 
the Sherman Act by their misuse of the successorship clause. 504 F.2d at 905. 
31. Depending on the degree of continuity from the predecessor's operation, the suc- 
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A. Applicability to Successor 
The Supreme Court has admitted that "[tlhere is and can 
be, no single definition of 'successor' which is applicable in every 
legal context. A new employer, in other words, may be a successor 
for some purposes and not for others."32 Within the wide range of 
"successors" for successorship doctrine purposes, only a narrow 
band can be considered "successors and assigns" for successor- 
ship clause purposes. The successorship doctrine has been ap- 
plied to almost every form of transferring a business,33 and in 
most cases hiring a large portion of a predecessor's employees has 
been persuasive evidence of successorship within the general fed- 
eral labor law doctrine.34 
For a new employer to fall within the narrow category of 
successors to whom successorship clauses apply, it must be a 
"successor or assign" of the entire going business of the predeces- 
sor. The purchase of less than all assets and assumption of only 
some of a predecessor's fixed obligations does not bring the suc- 
cessorship doctrine may impose a duty to arbitrate with the union or a duty to recognize 
and bargain with the union. These two major strands of the successorship doctrine are 
discussed in greater detail below in text accompanying notes 58-95 infra. 
32. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 262 n.9 
(1974). 
33. Valleydale Packers, Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 1486, 1490 (1967). Successorship can be 
found in a reorganization of company ownership, sale or lease of company assets, transfer 
from a foreclosing creditor or bankruptcy trustee, or loss of a sales franchise or service 
contract by competitive bidding. Slicker, supra note 5, a t  1062-63. 
34. E.g., NLRB v. Wayne Convalescent Center, Inc., 465 F.2d 1039,1041-42 (6th Cir. 
1972). The broad test for successorship doctrine purposes is whether, from the employees' 
viewpoint, "the employing industry remains essentially the same." Valleydale Packers, 
Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 1486, 1490 (1967). For example, hiring a majority of its work force from 
among existing employees will obligate a successor to recognize and bargain with the 
predecessor's union, NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Sews., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972) (dis- 
cussed a t  notes 60-65 and accompanying text infra), and to honor unfair labor practice 
awards against the predecessor when the successor has notice. Golden State Bottling Co. 
v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973) (discussed at notes 15-16 and accompanying text supra). 
The successor must also submit to arbitration the issue of what substantive provisions of 
the existing collective bargaining agreement will be binding on it  when the successor hires 
almost the identical work force. John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964) 
(discussed a t  notes 74-86 and accompanying text infra). A new employer cannot, however, 
avoid successorship doctrine duties by discriminating against the predecessor's employees 
in hiring without violating $ 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. Compare How- 
ard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 262 & n.8 (1974) (no 
violation) with NLRB v. Houston Distribution Serv., Inc, 573 F.2d 26a-(5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 99 S. Ct. 722 (1978); NLRB v. Foodway of El Paso, 496 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1974); 
K.B. & J. Young's Super Mkts., Inc. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 463 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 
U.S. 841 (1967); NLRB v. New England Tank Indus., Inc., 302 F.2d 273 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 371 U.S. 875 (1962); and Macomb Block & Supply, Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 1285 (1976). 
See also Severson & Willcoxon, supra note 5, a t  839-43. 
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cessor within the scope of a successorship clause.35 Similarly, a 
lessee of the predecessor's plant is not a successor subject to a 
successorship clause, especially if there is a hiatus between opera- 
tions. 36 
In 1972 the Second Circuit held that a successorship clause 
purporting to bind a purchaser of less than all the predecessor's 
assets is a "hot cargo" agreement in violation of section 8(e) of 
the National Labor Relations Act and therefore invalid.37 The 
NLRB quickly followed suit in a related case.38 In a flurry of more 
recent cases, the NLRB has made it clear that successorship 
clauses do not violate section 8(e) if narrowed in scope to apply 
only in situations where the entire business is sold to the succes- 
s ~ r . ~ ~  These cases illustrate the distinction that while selling off' 
some assets can fall within the scope of "doing business" referred 
to in section 8(e), a sale of the entire going concern is ceasing 
business, not doing business. 
B. Enforceability Against Successors 
1 .  Not binding absent consent 
Successorship clauses have generally been held not to bind 
a successor without its consent to the substantive terms and con- 
ditions of a predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. Courts 
(and to a lesser extent the NLRB) have been fairly consistent in 
applying basic contract law-a party cannot be bound by a con- 
35. Machinists Local 954 v. Shawnee Indus., Inc., 224 F. Supp. 347, 352 (W.D. Okla. 
1963); Phoenix Brewery Corp. v. Brewery Workers Local 194, 30 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 
21 (1958) (Kates, Arb.). See also MGM-Telestudios, Inc. v. IEW Local 1212,48 Lab. Arb. 
& Disp. Settl. 1267 (1967) (Wolff, Arb.). 
36. Drivers Local 75 v. Wisconsin Employee Relations Bd., 61 L.R.R.M. 2113 (Wis. 
1965). 
37. National Maritime Union v. Commerce Tankers Corp., 457 F.2d 1127 (2d Cir. 
1972). Section 8(e) defines and invalidates hot cargo agreements as follows: 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any 
employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby 
such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, 
using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any 
other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any 
contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an 
agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible and avoid . . . . 
29 U.S.C. 5 158(e) (1976). 
38. National Maritime Union (Vantage Steamship Corp.), 196 N.L.R.B. 1100 (1972). 
39. Local 814, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Bader Bros. Warehouses), 225 N.L.R.B. 609 
(1976); District 71, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists (Harris Truck & Trailer Sales, Inc.), 224 
N.L.R.B. 100 (1976); Operating Engineers Local 701 (Cascade Employers Ass'n), 221 
N.L.R.B. 751 (1975). See also UMW (Lone Star Steel Co.), 231 N.L.R.B. 573 (1977). 
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tract to which it did not consent. Despite indications that federal 
labor policy could outweigh this contract principle in some suc- 
cessorship  situation^,^^ the Supreme Court clearly established in 
NLRB u. Burns International Security Services, I ~ c . ~ ~  that, ab- 
sent consent, a successor is not bound by the predecessor's agree- 
ment, a t  least when no successorship clause is involved. Of 
course, if a successor either expressly consents to be bound by the 
predecessor's contract with a union or is nothing more than the 
alter ego of the predecessor, the successor is bound by the sub- 
stantive terms of the unexpired collective bargaining agreement.42 
In 1974 the Supreme Court refused to enforce a successorship 
clause against a successor in Howard Johnsbn Co. u. Detroit Local 
Joint Executive Board. 43 Applying the successonhip doctrine, the 
Court reasoned that the successor was neither bound to arbitrate 
the effect of the predecessor's contract nor to bargain with the 
union because it had renounced the unexpired labor contract and 
had hired over three-fourths of its employees from other sources.44 
A few earlier cases had also held that even the purchase of sub- 
stantially all of a predecessor's assets did not give a successorship 
clause effect or impose any affirmative duties under the succes- 
sorship doctrine if the successor had hired predominantly differ- 
ent work forces.45 
In Emerald Maintenance, Inc. u. NLRB46 the Fifth Circuit 
refused to enforce a successorship clause against a successor who 
had obtained a service contract by competitive bidding even 
though it had hired over three-fourths of its employees from the 
predecessor's work force. The successor was only required to rec- 
40. See John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543,550 (1964);Detroit Local Joint 
Exec. Bd. v. Howard Johnson Co., 482 F.2d 489, 494 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 249 
(1974); Comment, Successor Corporation Subject to Labor Arbitration Agreement of 
Merged Corporation, 17 SYRACUSE L. REV. 513, 513-14 (1966). 
41. 406 U.S. 272 (1972). 
42. Examples of alter ego cases include: Crawford Door Sales Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 1144 
(1976); Bell Co., 225 N.L.R.B. 474 (1976); Associated Transp. Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 62 (1971); 
California Footwear Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 765 (1955). See also NLRB v. Southport Petroleum 
Co., 315 U.S. 100 (1942); NLRB v. Herman Bros. Pet Supply, Inc., 325 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 
1963); NLRB v. Ozark Hardwood Co., 282 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1960); Dickey v. NLRB, 217 
F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Weirton Steel Co., 135 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1943). 
43. 417 U.S. 249 (1974). 
44. Only nine of Howard Johnson's 45 employees had been employed by the predeces- 
-- - - 
sor franchisee. Id. a t  252. 
45. E.g., Retail Store Employees Local 954 v. Lane's of Findlay, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 
655 (N.D. Ohio 1966). See also Tarr v. Street Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees Div. 
1055, 73 Idaho 223, 250 P.2d 904 (1952) (same result even though some of predecessor's 
employees were retained). 
46. 464 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1972). 
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ognize the predecessor's union and to bargain with it pursuant to 
the then very recent Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Burns 
International Security Services, Inc.," which had involved an 
almost identical fact situation except that the labor agreement 
considered in Burns contained no successorship clause. This fac- 
tual difference,. however, was insufficient to distinguish the two 
cases: 
Burns compels this Court to hold that the union's petition 
for review [of the NLRB's refusal to enforce the successorship 
clause] cannot be sustained. First, a successor employer in the 
position of Emerald is not bound by the substantive provisions 
of a collective bargaining agreement, negotiated by a predeces- 
sor, to which the successor has not agreed or the obligations of 
which are not assumed.48 
The duty to bargain with a predecessor's union, without any obli- 
gation to honor a successorship clause, has also been applied by 
the NLRB to a successor to a franchise that retained the prede- 
cessor's entire work force.49 
Perhaps the deadliest blow to the enforceability of successor- 
ship clauses against successors was the Ninth Circuit's holding in 
Bartenders & Culinary Workers Local 340 v. Howard Johnson 
CO? As in Howard Johnson Co. v.  Detroit Local Joint Executive 
Board," the successor purchased the assets of the predecessor 
franchisee, except this time the successor retained practically the 
entire work force of the predecessor. The Ninth Circuit refused to 
enforce the successorship clause in light of the Supreme Court's 
holding in Burns,52 but recognized that the successor may be re- 
quired under the successorship doctrine to submit to arbitrations 
in light of the High Court's earlier holding in John Wiley & Sons 
v. L i ~ i n g s t o n . ~ ~  Any language in prior cases indicating that a 
successorship clause may be enforceable against a nonconsenting 
successor was declared by the Ninth Circuit to be for the most 
part inadvertent dicta and not contr~l l ing.~~ 
47. 406 U.S. 272 (1972). 
48. Emerald Maintenance, Inc. v. NLRB, 464 F.2d at 701. 
49. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 217 N.L.R.B. 73, 78 (1975). 
50. 535 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1976). 
51. 417 U.S. 249 (1974). 
52. 535 F.2d at 1162 (citing NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., 406 U.S. 272 (1972)). 
53. Id. at 1163. 
54. 376 U.S. 543, 555 (1964) (arbitrator, not court, to determine whether any of the 
substantive terms of the agreement are binding on successor); note 80 infra. 
55. 535 F.2d a t  1163 n.4, 1164 n.6. These footnotes distinguish or explain, seriatim, 
language in Wackenhut Corp. v. Plant Guard Workers Local 151, 332 F.2d 954, 958 (9th 
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These cases clearly show that the existence of a successorship 
clause alone is insufficient to bind a successor to the substantive 
terms of a predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. Cases 
like Emerald Maintenance can be reconciled as instances where 
the new employer does not fall within the narrow definition of 
successor necessary for a successorship clause to apply.56 How- 
ever, the successors in Howard Johnson and Bartenders & Culi- 
nary Workers do fit the narrow definition, especially in the latter 
case where the predecessor's work force was almost entirely re- 
tained. Both courts nevertheless refused to enforce successor- 
ship clauses against the successors, apparently believing that the 
proper balance is struck by the successorship doctrine regardless 
of the existence of successorship  clause^.^' 
2. Interplay with successorship doctrine 
While the two major strands of successorship doctrine devel- 
oped in NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, I ~ C . ~ ~  
and John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston" appear to prevail over 
express successorship clauses, neither case actually involved such 
a clause. It is theoretically possible, however, for the existence of 
a successorship clause to affect the application of these two major 
strands of successorship doctrine. 
a. Burns-duty to bargain. Citing a series of NLRB deci- 
sions, the Supreme Court in Burns held that "although successor 
employers may be bound to recognize and bargain with the union, 
they are not bound by the substantive provisions of a collective- 
bargaining contract negotiated by their predecessors but not 
agreed to or assumed by them."" The duty to bargain can take 
Cir. 1964); Teamsters Local 524 v. Billington, 402 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1968); ~eamsters  
Local 249 v. Bill's Trucking, Inc., 493 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Burns Int'l 
Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272,305 (1972); Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint 
Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 258 n.3 (1974). 
56. It can be argued that since the transfer of the business to Emerald Maintenance 
was by competitive bidding instead of by a voluntary sale from the predecessor, the 
successorship clause in the predecessor's contract is irrelevant. For further discussion of 
the applicability of successorship clauses to an involuntary transfer of a business, see text 
accompanying notes 112-16 infra. 
57. For a discussion of the balance struck by this doctrine, see Bartenders & Culinary 
Workers Local 340 v. Howard Johnson Co., 535 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1976). 
58. 406 U.S. 272 (1972). - -  - .- - 
59. 376 U.S. 543 (1964). 
60. 406 U.S. at 284 (citing Rohlik, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1242 n.15 (1964); Slater 
Sys. Md., Inc., 134 N.L.R.B. 865, 866 (1961); General Extrusion Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1165, 
1168 (1958); Jolly Giant Lumber Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 413, 414 (1955); International Long- 
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two forms: (1) the duty to recognize the predecessor's union as 
bargaining agent after initial hiring or (2) the duty to bargain 
with that union over the initial terms of hiring before the hiring 
takes place. Although it was not clear when Burns first came 
down," subsequent cases have held that the successor must recog- 
nize the union and henceforth bargain with it regarding any 
changes in terms and conditions of employment only if a majority 
of the successor's work force had been employees of the predeces- 
sor and represented by the union." Burns also hypothesized that 
if "it is perfectly clear that the new employer plans to retain all 
of the employees in the unit . . . it will be appropriate to have 
him initially consult with the employees' bargaining representa- 
tive before he fixes [initial] terms [of empl~yrnent]."~~ This 
strand of the successorship doctrine--requiring a nonconsenting 
successor to bargain without binding it to the contract-applies 
in cases factually analogous to Burns;64 even an express succes- 
sorship clause will be subordinate? 
The Burns-like cases in which a successorship clause may 
make a difference are those involving an implied consent of the 
successor employer to be bound by the substantive terms of a 
predecessor's labor contract. This is an express exception to the 
general rule in Burns and can be determined as an issue of fact? 
A successor's knowledge of the existence of a successorship clause 
could tip the scales toward finding an implied adoption and, by 
analogy to express adoption, the successor could be held to all the 
shoremen's Local 16 (Juneau Spruce Corp.), 82 N.L.R.B. 650,658-59 (1949), enforced, 189 
F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1951), aff'd, 342 U.S. 237 (1952)). 
61. See 406 U.S. at 277-81 (frequent references to "majority"); Note, The Bargaining 
Obligations of Successor Employers, 88 HAW. L. REV. 759, 771-76 (1975). 
62. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc. v. NLRB, 553 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. 
Band-Age, Inc., 534 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976). Cf. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint 
Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974) (only nine of successor's 45 employees had worked for 
predecessor). 
63. 406 U.S. at 294-95. Subsequent cases have illustrated in what instances it will 
and will not be "perfectly clear." Compare Spitzer Akron, Inc. v. NLRB, 540 F.2d 841 
(6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 US.  1040 (1977); NLRB v. Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 468 
F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1972); C.M.E., Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 514 (1976); and Ivo H. Denham, 206 
N.L.R.B. 659 (1973) with Nazareth Regional High School v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 
1977) and Spruce Up Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 194 (1974). 
64. E.g., Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ. v. Ross Aviation, Inc., 504 F.2d 896 (5th 
Cir. 1974) (discussed at notes 28-30 and accompanying text supra); Emerald Mainte- 
nance, Inc. v. NLRB, 464 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1972) (discussed at notes 46-48 and accompa- 
nying text supra). 
65. See, e.g., Emerald Maintenance, Inc. v. NLRB, 464 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1972); text 
accompanying notes 46-49 supra. 
66. 406 U.S. at 291; Slicker, supra note 5, at 1099-100. 
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substantive terms of that labor contract,67 even those of which the 
successor is 
In 1965 a state court held that a successor's knowledge of the 
successorship clause coupled with its contribution to the union's 
health, welfare, and pension fund was sufficient to support the 
jury's finding that the successor had adopted the predecessor's 
collective bargaining agreement with the union." Similarly, in 
1978 a federal district court held that a successor employer had 
implicitly assumed the predecessor's labor agreement by failing 
to disclaim the labor contract and successonhip clause, and by 
following most of the other terms of the existing collective bar- 
gaining agreement." In determining whether the successor fell 
into the implied adoption exception mentioned in Burns, these 
courts considered the usual factors of (1) the form of the transfer 
of the business,71 (2) whether the successor had continued to 
honor some or all of the labor contract's terms,72 and (3) whether 
the successor had disclaimed assumption of the collective bar- 
gaining agreement.73 In addition, the existence of a successorship 
clause should be recognized as a significant factor in applying the 
exception and binding a successor to the substantive terms of a 
predecessor's labor agreement. 
67. E.g., Stockton Door Co., 218 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1975); Patton Throwing Mills, Inc. 
v. Textile Workers Union, 13 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 614 (1949) (Karpinsky, Arb.). 
68. E.g., Spatex Corp. v. Textile Workers Local 770, 11 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 1076 
(1949) (Maggs, Arb.). 
69. Horn Transfer Lines, Inc. v. Morgan, 61 L.R.R.M. 2161, 2162 (Ky. 1965). 
70. General Truck Drivers Local 92 v. Strabley Bldg. Supply, Inc., [I9781 LAB. L. 
REP. (CCH) (84 Lab. Cas. 18,681) fi 10,694, a t  18,685-86 (N.D. Ohio). 
71. "[Iln a variety of circumstances involving a merger, stock acquisition, reorgani- 
zation, or assets purchase, the Board might properly find as a matter of fact that the 
successor had assumed the obligations under the old contract. Cf. Oilfield Maintenance 
Co., 142 NLRB 1384 (1963)." NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272,291 
(1972). 
72. Courts have held a successor bound to the predecessor's collective bargaining 
agreement if nearly all the terms and conditions of the agreement had been continued by 
the successor. See NLRB v. Pine Valley Div. of Ethan Allen, Inc., 544 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 
1976); General Truck Drivers Local 92 v. Strabley Bldg. Supply, Inc., [I9781 LAB. L. REP. 
(CCH) (84 Lab. Cas. 18,681) fi 10,694 (N.D. Ohio). But see Virginia Sportswear, Inc., 226 
N.L.R.B. 1296 (1976). Some cases have held that honoring even a few of the terms is 
sufficient to bind the successor to the entire agreement. See Eklund's Sweden House Inn, 
Inc., 203 N .L.R.B. 413 (1973) ; Horn Transfer Lines, Inc. v. Morgan, 61 L.R.R.M. 2161 (Ky . 
1966). 
73. In Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint ~xecTBd., 417 U S .  249, 251-52 
(1974), the Supreme Court emphasized that the successor was not bound because, a t  least 
in part, it had expressly refused to assume the existing labor contract. But, in Eklund's 
Sweden House Inn, Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. 413 (1973), the NLRB held that the disclaimer was 
not enough to halt a finding of implied adoption when some of the terms of the labor 
contract were continued by the successor. 
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b. Wiley-duty to arbitrate. Recent cases demonstrate that 
the Supreme Court's 1964 holding in John Wiley & Sons v. 
Livingston7* is still good law," despite speculation that it may 
have been overruled in effect by Burns in 1972.76 The Court in 
Wiley decided that even without a successorship clause "a corpo- 
rate employer must arbitrate with a union under a bargaining 
agreement between the union and another corporation which has 
merged with the employer."" 
In successorship cases involving "the continuity required by 
Wiley,"" an arbitrator is placed in a new and unfamiliar role." 
He must "decide which provisions of the agreement will bind the 
nonconsenting party; he does not construe existing terms, but 
decides whether there are terms, and if so, what they are."80 The 
courts have set no standards or guidelines for an arbitrator to 
followg1 except that any term imposed on the successor should not 
- -- -- - 
- 
74. 376 U.S. 543 (1964). 
75. See, e.g., Local 1115, Joint Bd. Nursing Home & Hosp. Employees v. B & K Invs., 
Inc., 436 F. Supp. 1203, 1208 (S.D. Fla. 1977). 
76. The opinion in Burns itself sought to distinguish Wiley, 406 U.S. a t  285-87, but 
the Supreme Court confessed in Howard Johnson "that the reasoning of Wiley was to some 
extent inconsistent with our more recent decision in NLRB v. Burns International Secu- 
rity Services." 417 US.  at 254 (citation omitted). See also Severson & Willcoxon, supra 
note 5, at 813-15; Slicker, supra note 5, at 1097-102. 
77. 376 U.S. a t  544 (for the arbitrator's award see Interscience Encyclopedia, Inc. v. 
District 65, Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union, 55 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 210 (1970) 
(Roberts, Arb.)). 
78. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 258 n.3 
(1974). 
79. See Note, The Successor Employer's Duty to Arbitrate: A Reconsideration of 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 82 HARV. L. REV. 418, 426 (1968). 
80. Comment, Contractual Successorship: The Impact of Burns, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 
617, 631 (1973) (footnote omitted). The court or the NLRB must decide whether a new 
employer is a successor employer and, if so, to what degree in order to determine what 
duties are imposed. If a court decides there is sufficient continuity in the successor under 
Wiley, it can require the successor to submit ,to an arbitrator the question of which 
provisions of the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement survive the transfer. How- 
ever, a federal court may not go the next step and decide which terms are binding on the 
successor. See Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. United Air Lines, Inc., 325 F.2d 576 
(6th Cir. 1963). Once a court determines that a successor is subject to arbitration, the 
arbitrator can decide whether procedural prerequisites to arbitration under the union 
contract have been satisfied, John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543,557 (1964); 
and then decide which labor contract terms to impose on the successor, United Steelwork- 
ers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964); Food Employees Local 590 v. 
National Tea Co., 346 F. Supp. 875, 881 (W.D. Pa. 1972); In re Swift & Co., 8 Lab. Arb. 
& Disp. Settl. 1065 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947). Arbitration cannot be imposed on a successor 
until a court has acted, In re Hart Sales Corp., 56 L.R.R.M. 2901 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964), 
and afterward, federal courts are powerless to enjoin the arbitration, Rosenberg v. Ladies' 
Garment Workers Local 109, 53 Lab. Cas. 65,300 (M.D. Pa. 1966). 
81. Comment, Successor Corporation Subject to Labor Arbitration Agreement of 
Merged Corporation, 17 SYRACUSE L. REV. 513, 519-20 (1966). 
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be "unreasonable or ineq~itable."~~ Wiley suggests that the en- 
forceability of seniority, contribution to pension funds, job secu- 
rity, severance pay, and vacation pay provisions is proper for 
arbitration." Dues checkoff provisions have also been imposed on 
successor employers by arbitrators." In fact, all provisions of a 
predecessor's labor contract could be imposed by an arbitrator" 
and presumably enforced by a court according the usual defer- 
ence to an arbitrator's decision.86 
Successorship clauses superimposed on this Wiley strand of 
the successorship doctrine make a bootstrap possible. For exam- 
ple, in Local 1115, Joint Board Nursing Home & Hospital Em- 
ployees u. B & K Investments, Inc." the union attempted to 
enforce successorship clauses against the successor, B & K Invest- 
ments. The court was to determine whether the successor "was 
either bound by the collective bargaining agreements or had a 
duty to arbitrate under them."88 Relying on Burns, the court re- 
fused to impose the labor agreement,8@ but did compel the succes- 
sor to arbitrate "[wlhether or not any of the substantive terms 
of the agreement are binding" because, following Wiley, "there 
is such substantial continuity . . . of identity in the work force?O 
A simple bootstrap past the court's holding regarding Burns could 
be accomplished by an arbitrator's finding that the successorship 
clause is one of the provisions of the collective bargaining agree- 
ment that has survived the transfer of the business to the succes- 
sor? 
82. United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc., 335 F.2d 891, 895 (3d Cir. 1964). 
83. 376 U.S. at 552-55; see Interscience Encyclopedia, Inc. v. District 65, Retail, 
Wholesale & Dep't Store Union, 55 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 210 (1970) (Roberts, Arb.). 
84. E.g., United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713, 719 (5th 
Cir. 1974). 
85. Comment, Contractual Successorship: The Impact of Burns, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 
617, 617-18 (1973). Experience shows, however, that arbitrators have often refused to bind 
a successor to even the vacation pay benefits of a predecessor. See Merchants Transfer 
Co. v. Teamsters Local 639, 77-2 Lab. Arb. Awards 5644 (1977) (Daly, Arb.); National 
Beverage Co. v. Brewery Workers Local 111,63 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 186 (1974) (Sisk, 
Arb.). See also New England Lead Burning Corp. v. Lodge 27, Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 
58 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 1254 (1972) (Keefe, Arb.); M & T Co. v. International Ass'n 
of Machinists, 69-1 Lab. Arb. Awards 3278 (1968) (Caraway, Arb.). 
86. See generally The Steelworkers Trilogy: United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel 
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960), United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 
363 U.S. 574 (1960), and United Steelworkers v. American - Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). 
-- 
87. 436 F. Supp. 1203 (S.D. Fla. 1977). 
88. Id. at 1206. 
89. Id. at 1207-08. 
90. Id. at 1209. 
91. It is not known what the arbitrator has actually done (or will do) in this case, 
but the potential for bootstrapping is clearly demonstrated here by the union's timely 
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On several occasions, arbitrators have found successorship 
clauses binding on successors.92 However, since the Burns deci- 
sion in 1972, no arbitrator has followed these earlier awards." In 
fact, two cases just prior to Burns demonstrate that there is little 
possibility of a bootstrap past Burns' holding that a successor is 
not normally bound by the substantive terms of a predecessor's 
collective bargaining agreement. 
In Thee1 u. Four Lakes Concrete C ~ r p . ' ~  the court refused to 
overturn an arbitrator's decision to compel the successor em- 
ployer to dovetail seniority for the predecessor's employees it had 
hired. The arbitrator relied on a successorship clause for his deci- 
sion regarding seniority, but did not give full effect to the wording 
of the clause itself. Almost simultaneously with Theel, the court 
in Andrus v. Convoy refused to overturn an arbitrator's 
decision denying dovetailing of seniority for former employees of 
the predecessor then employed by the successor. The successor- 
ship clause was found by the arbitrator to have no effect on the 
successor employer. The existence of a successorship clause, 
therefore, does not lead arbitrators to a carte blanche imposition 
of the predecessor's labor agreement, but can influence the arbi- 
trator's analysis of each provision of the agreement in his piece- 
meal decision of which provisions should survive the transfer of 
the business to the successor. 
3. California Labor Code $ 1127 
When it became fairly clear to the California Legislature that 
"[elxisting law [did] not impose the terms and conditions of 
collective bargaining agreements between employers and labor 
attempt to enforce successorship duties. A union is deemed to have waived its right to 
arbitrate the effect of a successorship clause, however, if it fails to proceed in good faith 
to make a timely demand to arbitrate. Russom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 415 F. Supp. 
792, 798 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff'd, 558 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1977). 
92. Lake States Leasing Corp. v. General Teamsters Local 126,46 Lab. Arb. & Disp. 
Settl. 935 (1966) (Gundermann, Arb.); Walker Bros. v. IEW Local 1088, 41 Lab. Arb. & 
Disp. Settl. 844, 850-56 (1963) (Crawford, Arb.) (discussing numerous arbitration awards 
binding successors to predecessors' labor contracts); Sigman Meat Co. v. Butcher Work- 
men Local 641, 40 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 540 (1963) (Seligson, Linquist, & McCabe, 
Arbs.). 
93. As soon as certiorari was granted in Burns, the reliability of these earlier arbitra- 
tion awards was thought to be clouded. See Machinists Dist. 147 v. Northeast Airlines, 
Inc., 473 F.2d 549, 553 (1st Cir. 1972). 
94. 64 Lab. Cas. 20,428 (W.D. Wis. 1971). 
95. 65 Lab. Cas. 21,023 (N.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 480 F.2d 604 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
414 U S .  989 (1973). See also Sanborn's Motor Express, Inc. v. Truck Drivers Local 340, 
44 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 346 (1965) (Wallen, Arb.). 
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organizations upon employers succeeding to contracting employ- 
ers' busines~es,"~ section 1127 was added to the California Labor 
Code? The section provides that "[wlhere a collective bargain- 
ing agreement . . . contains a successor clause, such clause shall 
be binding upon and enforceable against any successor em- 
p l ~ y e r . " ~  The impact of section 1127, however, will be very slight 
because the pervasive nature of federal labor law coverage leaves 
relatively few situations to which the section can apply.99 
California has been the only jurisdiction to legislate the en- 
forceability of successorship clauses, but no court has construed 
section 1127 or tested its validity.lW Federal statutes requiring a 
successor to certain federally funded projects to maintain the 
wages and benefits established by the predecessor's labor con- 
96. 1976 Cal. Stats. Summary Digest 277. 
97. Act of Sept. 19,1976, ch. 1057,1976 Cal. Stats. 4686 (codified at CAL. LABOR CODE 
§ 1127 (West Supp. 1978)). The California Legislature took up the issue right after the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, while sitting in California, refused to enforce a successor- 
ship clause against the successor in Bartenders & Culinary Workers Local 340 v. Howard 
Johnson Co., 535 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1976). See text accompanying notes 50-55 supra. 
98. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1127(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1978): 
Where a collective bargaining agreement between an employer and a labor 
organization contains a successor clause, such clause shall be binding upon and 
enforceable against any successor employer who succeeds to the contracting 
employer's business until the expiration date of the agreement stated in the 
agreement. No such successor clause shall be binding upon or enforceable 
against any successor employer for more than three years from the effective date 
of the collective bargaining agreement between the contracting employer and 
the labor organization. 
As used in this section, "successor employer" means any purchaser, as- 
signee, or transferee of a business the employees of which are subject to a 
collective bargaining agreement, if such purchaser, assignee, or transferee con- 
ducts or will conduct substantially the same business operation, or offer the 
same service, and use the same physical facilities, as the contracting employer. 
99. Section 1127 on its face does not apply "to any employer who is subject to the 
National Labor Relations Act." CAL. LAB. CODE 4 1127(c) (West Supp. 1978): 
This section shall not apply to a receiver or trustee in bankruptcy of any 
contracting employer who has gone into receivership or bankruptcy, or to any 
employer who acquires a business from a receiver or trustee in bankruptcy, or 
to any employer which is a public entity, or to any employer who is subject to 
the National Labor Relations Act, Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975, or 
the Railway Labor Act. 
This severe restriction is necessary to avoid running afoul of federal preemption. See 
Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 245-47 (1962); Textile Workers Union v. 
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957); California Sta-te-Council of Carpenters v. 
Associated Gen. Contractors, 404 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Butchers Local 
532 v. Farmers Mkts., 67 Cal. App. 3d 905, 910, 136 Cal. Rptr. 894, 897 (1977); Holayter 
v. Smith, 29 Cal. App. 3d 326, 332-34, 104 Cal. Rptr. 745, 749-51 (1972). 
100. The fact that there are no reported cases involving 4 1127 in the years since its 
enactment is further evidence of how rarely it is applicable. 
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tract1@' illustrate a public policy to support provisions like section 
1 127.1°2 Moreover, collective bargaining agreements are entitled 
to special consideration in light of labor law policy that can over- 
ride the basic contract principle of mutual consent in some in- 
stances.la These factors must be weighed against the belief of 
courts generally that the judicially created successorship doctrine 
strikes the proper balance in determining the extent of a succes- 
sor's labor obligations regardless of the existence of a successor- 
ship clause.lM 
IV. EFFECT ON PREDECESSOR EMPLOYERS 
Some of the decisions refusing to enforce successorship 
clauses against nonconsenting successors have suggested that en- 
forcement should be sought against predecessor employers in- 
stead.lo6 The successors' defense of no consent is not available to 
predecessors since they are parties to the collective bargaining 
contract. A successorship clause may explicitly obligate the pred- 
ecessor to make assumption of the labor contract a mandatory 
condition of the sale of the businessla or a similar duty can be 
inferred from a successorship clause with more general lan- 
guage. lo7 
101. E.g., 41 U.S.C. 4 353(c) (1976) (Government Service Contract Labor Standards); 
49 U.S.C. 4 1609(c) (1970) (Urban Mass Transportation Labor Standards). Neither of 
these provisions depends on the existence of a successorship clause in the predecessor's 
collective bargaining agreement. 
102. Broad police powers are available to state legislatures. "Under the expanded 
conception, the police power means the general power to preserve and promote the public 
welfare, even a t  the expense of private rights." B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 44 
(1972) (citation omitted). The focus of police power has evolved from "sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas" to "public health, safety and morals" and finally to "public welfare". 
See id. a t  42-45. 
103. Note 40 supra. 
104. Regarding state regulation of labor, the Supreme Court has held that state labor 
laws must "not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition, or of some 
valid federal law." Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 
535, 536 (1949). The issue, therefore, is whether the judiciary's successorship doctrine is 
"valid federal law" and, if so, whether 6 1127 of the California Labor Code "run[s] afoul" 
of it. 
105. E.g., Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 US.  249, 257- 
58 & n.3 (1974). 
106. See, e.g., note 10 and accompanying text supra. 
107. See, e.g., Bressette v. International Talc Co., 527 F.2d 211,214-15 (2d Cir. 1975). 
See also CAL. LAB. CODE 6 1127(d) (West Supp. 1978): 
An employer who is a party to a collective bargaining agreement containing 
a successor clause has the aff i ia t ive duty to disclose the existence of such 
agreement and such clause to any successor employer. Such disclosure require- 
ment shall b~ satisfied by including in any contract of sale, agreement to pur- 
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As with successors, a successorship clause will apply to a 
particular predecessor employer only if the entire business is 
transferred. In addition, the applicability of a successorship 
clause is limited to a voluntary transfer of the business. 
If a predecessor employer breaches a successorship clause by 
not binding its successor to the existing labor contract, there are 
two possible remedies. In some cases it may be appropriate for the 
union or employees to recover damages from the predecessor, but 
this remedy is often inadequate. An injunction to halt the transfer 
of the business to the successor is also possible, but rarely 
granted. Practically, an injunction is a hollow remedy after a sale 
of the business has been consummated and courts have often 
considered even a timely injunction prior to the sale to be an 
unreasonable restraint on alienation. log 
A. Applicability to Predecessors 
As previously discussed,10g successorship clauses can apply 
only to situations where a transfer of the entire business is con- 
templated. The first case to invalidate a successorship clause 
covering the transfer of less than all the predecessor's assets ac- 
tually involved a defendant predecessor rather than a successor. 
The union in National Maritime Union v. Commerce Tankers 
Corp.ll@ attempted to apply and enforce a successorship clause 
against a predecessor employer who was selling one of its ships 
without imposing the labor contract on the buyer. The court held, 
in effect, that the hot cargo prohibition in section 8(e) of the 
National Labor Elelations Actlll sets one specific limit on the 
applicability of successorship clauses to predecessor employers 
transferring less than their entire businesses. 
Even when the entire business is being transferred to the 
successor, a successorship clause may not apply to a predecessor 
if the transfer is involuntary. Under the successorship doctrine, 
which has essentially preempted the applicability and enforcea- 
bility of successorship clauses against successors, the form of the 
transfer is largely irrelevant.l12 With regard to predecessors, how- 
- -- 
chase, or any similar instrument of conveyance, a statement that the successor 
employer is bound by such successor clause as provided for in the collective 
bargaining agreement. 
108. See text accompanying notes 145-51 infra. 
109. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra. 
110. 457 F.2d 1127 (2d Cir. 1972). 
111. 29 U.S.C. 8 158(e) (1976) (for pertinent excerpt, see note 37 supra). 
112. See note 33 supra. 
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ever, the form of the transfer can be critical. 
Since there is no sales agreement in an involuntary transfer 
of the business, it would be ludicrous to sue the predecessor under 
a successorship clause for failing to make assumption of the exist- 
ing labor contract a condition of the transfer. For example, the 
Burns-like predecessor in Emerald Maintenance, Inc. u. NL RB l3 
had no power to impose the union contract on its successor be- 
cause the successor had won the service contract by competitive 
bidding without ever meeting or negotiating face to face with the 
predecessor.l14 A foreclosing creditor115 or a successor who picks up 
the business after a hiatus116 also appears to be sufficiently re- 
moved from the predecessor to thwart any action against the 
predecessor for damages or an injunction. 
B. Enforceability Against Predecessors 
I .  Damages from predecessor employers 
While some successorship clauses specifically state that a 
predecessor must pay damages to the union if it fails to bind its 
successor,117 most do not and any remedy must be sought through 
an arbitrator or a court. The tendency has been for courts to defer 
to arbitrators, merely holding that a predecessor employer is still 
obligated to arbitrate the question even if it has gone out of busi- 
ness.l18 The Supreme Court in Howard Johnson mentioned that 
the union had a "realistic remedy" because the predecessors had 
agreed "to arbitrate the extent of their liability to the Union and 
their former employees."11B The remedy was considered 
113. 464 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1972) (discussed in text accompanying notes 46-48 supra). 
114. If anyone would be the logical target for a suit, it would be the third party 
awarding the contract, but that third party has not agreed to be bound by a successorship 
clause. 
115. See Bohack Corp. v. Truck Drivers Local 807, 431 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.N.Y.), 
afw,  567 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1977). See also In re Penn Fruit Co.,92 L.R.R.M. 3548 (E.D. 
Pa. 1976); REA Express, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 92 L.R.R.M. 
3244 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); CAL. LAB. CODE 1 1127(c) (West Supp. 1978) (for full text, see note 
99 supra). 
116. See cases cited in Coughlin & Van de Kerckhove, supra note 1, at 32,41-42 n.19. 
See also Office Employees Local 153 v. Ward-Garcia Corp., 190 F. Supp. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 
1961); Industrial Catering Co., 224 N.L.R.B. 972 (1976). 
117. See, e.g., Local 814, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Bader Bros. Warehouses, Inc.), 225 
N.L.R.B. 609, 610-11 (1976). 
118. E-g., Bressette v. International Talc Co., 527 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1975) (distin- 
guishing Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965), and Procter 
& Gamble Independent Union v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1962), 
cert. denied, 374 US. 830 (1963)). 
119. 417 US.  at 257-58. 
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"realistic" because the predecessors had continued "as viable 
entities with substantial retained assets."120 
Leom Lee Corp. v. Heat & Frost Insulators Local 66121 pre- 
sented an arbitrator with the issue of damages when the predeces- 
sor sold its insulation business without binding the successor to 
the existing collective bargaining agreement in violation of a suc- 
cessorship clause. The arbitrator awarded the union damages 
against the predecessor122 to compensate for the union's loss of 
bargaining power, its impaired standing with union members, 
and its loss of income from dues, assessments, and the like? The 
arbitrator could find no undue hardship in imposing this award 
because the predecessor was still a going concern doing business 
in the industry under a different name. 
The arbitration award in Dawn Farms Corp. v. Teamsters 
Local 5&412' illustrates a t  least one problem associated with hold- 
ing a predecessor liable for failing to obligate a successor em- 
ployer to comply with a successorship clause. Dawn Farms' dairy 
and retail milk route business was bound by a collective bargain- 
ing agreement containing a successorship clause when it sold its 
entire business to Merlin Dairies. In an attempt to comply with 
the successorship clause, Dawn Farms included in the sales agree- 
ment a provision that the successor was to sign the existing collec- 
tive bargaining agreement when requested to by the union.]" 
When the successor subsequently refused to sign the union con- 
tract, the union demanded damages from the predecessor. The 
arbitrator concluded that the predecessor had violated the suc- 
cessorship clause and should be liable to the union for damages, 
but because of the predecessor's "good faith and the fact that it 
is no longer in the Milk Industry," the arbitrator exercised his 
"discretion so as to disallow a monetary Award."lZ6 This distin- 
120. Id. a t  257. 
121. 60 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 1310 (1972) (Gorsuch, Arb.) (the successorship clause 
was actually contained in a settlement agreement between the employer and union rather 
than in the collective bargaining agreement itself). 
122. Id. The arbitrator held the predecessor and successor employers jointly and 
severally liable for the award, finding the successor to be the alter ego of the predecessor. 
The successor's liability in this case is vicarious only; successors are not normally held 
liable for damages in such situations. See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra. 
123. Id. The arbitrator denied the union recovery for payments to picketers, expenses 
- - -  
incurred in patrolling the breach of the agreement, and attorneys' fees, 
124. 45 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 1075 (1965) (Wolff, Arb.). 
125. Id. a t  1075. 
126. Id. a t  1076. The arbitrator in essence suggested the union pursue remedies 
against the successor instead, referring to John Wiley & Sons v. Livngston, 376 U.S. 543 
(1964). 
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guishes the situation from that in Leona Lee Corp. where the 
predecessor was still doing business in the insulation industry 
under a different name. 
Another problem with a suit for damages is that a "monetary 
award is generally acknowledged to be an inadequate remedy for 
loss of employment."127 The damages awarded in Leona Lee Corp. 
were to compensate the union, not the employees. Of course, 
ousted employees of the predecessor employer have the right to 
sue for damages, "but the money damages remedy fails to recog- 
nize that the employee interest involved in the successorship con- 
text is the preservation of jobs. Thus, even if a money award could 
compensate the employees for their economic loss, it cannot ade- 
quately protect their other interests."128 
2. Enjoining the sale of the business 
After mentioning the possibility of a monetary award against 
the predecessor in Howard Johnson, the Supreme Court noted 
that "[tlhe Union apparently did not explore another remedy 
which might have been available to it prior to the sale, i.e., mov- 
ing to enjoin the sale to Howard Johnson on the ground that this 
was a breach by the [predecessor] of the successorship clauses 
in the collective-bargaining agreements."ln In other words, if the 
predecessor fails to give effect to a successorship clause, the union 
or the predecessor's employees can seek an injunction to halt the 
imminent sale of the business until the predecessor binds the 
successor to the existing labor contract. 
a. Examples of injunctions issued. The Supreme Court has 
implied that National Maritime Union v. Commerce Tankers 
Corp. 130 establishes a precedent for enjoining the sale of a business 
if the sale would violate a successorship clause.131 In Commerce 
Tankers, the district court did enjoin the employer's sale of one 
of its ships because an arbitrator had decided that to make the 
transfer without binding the buyer to the union contract would 
violate the successorship clause. The court agreed with the arbi- 
trator "that injunctive relief . . . is the only kind truly effective 
127. Severson & Willcoxon, supra note 5, at 839 (footnote omitted); see National 
Maritime Union v. Commerce Tankers Corp., 325 F. Supp. 360, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), 
vacated on other grounds, 457 F.2d 1127 (2d Cir. 1972). 
128. Severson & Willcoxon, supra note 5, at 839. 
129. 417 U.S. at 258 n.3. 
130. 325 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), vacated on other grounds, 457 F.2d 1127 (2d 
Cir. 1972). 
131. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., 417 U.S. at 258 n.3. 
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. . . . If the [predecessor] may simply shuck off the vessel and 
the collective agreement, the position of the Union (and its mem- 
bers) can never be restored or be accurately compensated for in 
money terms."132 Ultimately, the injunction was vacated and the 
predecessor was not required to bind the successor to the union 
contract because the particular successorship clause was found on 
appeal to be an invalid hot cargo agreement? 
Injunctions less drastic than the initial order in Commerce 
Tankers are also available based on the existence of a successor- 
ship clause in a collective bargaining agreement. In NLRB v. 
United Industrial Workers of the Seafarers Intermtional Union1" 
the union sought to enforce a successorship clause that merely 
bound the successor to recognize the predecessor's union.135 A 
preliminary injunction restraining transfer of the assets to the 
successor was granted on appeal,'" but when the case was tried 
on the merits the lack of continuity in the work force excused the 
successor from any successorship doctrine obligations. Another 
less drastic injunction based on a successorship clause was issued 
in Food Employees Local 590 v. National Tea Co. There the 
condition necessary to end the preliminary injunction was com- 
pletion of arbitration as to the effect of the successorship clause 
on the proposed closing of the predecessor's business. 
Cases issuing the broader type of injunction originally 
granted in Commerce Tankers are not to be found. The closest a 
court has come to enjoining a transfer of a business to give effect 
to a successorship clause is Local 1115, Nursing Home & Hospital 
Employees v. B & K Investments, Inc. 1 3 ~  Although the injunction 
was denied ostensibly because a sale of the business was not 
"imminent," the court discussed the practical problems asso- 
ciated with ever granting such a broad injunction based on a 
successorship clause. la 
b. Timing problems. Although unions or employees may be 
able to enjoin the predecessor's sale of the business, this offers 
132. 325 F. Supp. at 366. 
133. National Maritime Union v. Commerce Tankers Corp., 457 F.2d 1127 (2d Cir. 
1972); see notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra. 
134. 422 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970). 
135. See text accompanying notes 13-14 supra. 
136. United Indus. Workers of the Seafarers Int'l Union v. Board of"fPustees af-the 
Galveston Wharves, 351 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1965). 
137. 422 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970). 
138. 346 F. Supp. 875 (W.D. Pa. 1972). 
139. 436 F. Supp. 1203 (S.D. Fla. 1977). 
140. Id. at 1209. 
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them little solace if they do not learn of the sale until it is a fait 
accompli.141 An employer may have many legitimate reasons for 
working out a sales agreement behind closed doors. Once the sale 
is completed, it is too late for the union to enjoin the sale or for 
the employees to complain that the union failed to fairly repre- 
sent them.'" 
One way of preserving the opportunity to enjoin a sale of a 
business would be to include language in the successorship clause 
requiring the predecessor employer to give the union advance 
notice of any pending sale. Upon receiving notice the union would 
have the right to demand more details1" and would presumably 
be able to learn whether the predecessor intends to honor the 
successorship clause in sufficient time to seek an injunction. Such 
language could be patterned after the court's order in B & K 
Investments. While denying an injunction on the ground that the 
sale in violation of the successorship clause was not imminent, 
that court did order the employer "to give ten (10) days prior 
written notice by registered mail to the Union of any pending 
closing of a transaction directly or indirectly involving the sale, 
(assets or stock), lease, merger or any other disposition of the 
[business]. "144 
c. Unreasonable restraint on alienation. Without pausing 
to label it  as such, the Supreme Court made a brand of restraint- 
on-alienation analysis applicable to successorship cases when it 
stated in Burns that "[sladdling [a successor] employer with 
the terms and conditions of employment contained in the old 
collective-bargaining contract may make [desired] changes im- 
possible and may discourage and inhibit the transfer of capi- 
tal."145 The restrictive effect of collective bargaining agreements 
has been expressly recognized by several federal district courts 
that have recently held that receivers may terminate union con- 
tracts covering businesses in bankruptcy.14% each case the deci- 
141. See Severson & Willcoxon, supra note 5, a t  838. 
142. See Russom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 558 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1977). 
143. Cf. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967) (employer has a 
general obligation to provide information the union needs to carry out union functions). 
144. 436 F. Supp. at 1210. 
145. 406 U.S. at 288. 
146. Bohack Corp. v. Truck Drivers Local 807, 431 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.N.Y.), aff 'd, 
567 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1977); In re Penn Fruit Co., 92 L.R.R.M. 3548 (E.D. Pa. 1976); REA 
Express, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 92 L.R.R.M. 3244 (S.D.N .Y. 
1976). See also All State Factors, 205 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1973) (requiring a finance company 
in possession to bargain with the union but not holding it  to the terms of the debtor's union 
contract); CAL. LAB. CODE Q 1127(c) (West Supp. 1978) (for full text, see note 99 supra). 
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sion was based on a bankruptcy judge's findings that (1) the 
contract was onerous and burdensome and (2) equity favored 
termination of the agreement. 14' 
In B & K Investments the court refused to enjoin possible 
sales of the business in violation of the successorship clause be- 
cause no sale was imminent and because the present employer 
"should be free to offer the [business] on the market unfettered 
by the restraints of a Court Order which would certainly inhibit 
the ability of [the employer] to find a purchaser."148 Similarly, 
in Machinists District 147 v. Northeast Airlines, Inc. lqg the court 
refused to enjoin a merger pending arbitration as to the effect of 
a successorship clause in large part because an injunction would 
have devastated the merger. 
Although clouded by some additional issues, a similar con- 
clusion was reached in Teamsters Local 5 u. Pharmacies, Inc., 150 
where the court refused to enjoin the sale of a chain of pharmacies 
despite disregard of the successorship clause in the unexpired 
labor agreement. The facts of the case highlight the precise prob- 
lem: a liquidator had been appointed but his "efforts to sell the 
various store units of the business, either to a single purchaser or 
to separate buyers, were unsuccessful because prospective buyers 
were unwilling to undertake the obligations of the union con- 
tract."151 The impediment created by the successorship clause 
was simply found to be intolerable. 
All these cases indicate that even when a successorship 
clause would logically apply to a situation, courts are still hesi- 
tant to enjoin a predecessor's sale of a business solely because the 
predecessor has not required the successor to adopt the terms of 
an existing collective bargaining agreement. The hesitancy is 
apparently based on the principle of law disfavoring unreasonable 
restraints on alienation just as the reluctance of courts to enforce 
successorship clauses against successors seems rooted in the basic 
contract law principle that a party should not be bound without 
its consent to the substantive terms of a contract. 
147. See Bankruptcy Act, $ 313(1), 11 U.S.C. $ 713(1) (1976) (repealed and replaced 
by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549). 
148. 436 F. Supp. at 1209. 
149. 473 F.2d 549 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 -- (1972). - 
- ----- 
150. 84 L.R.R.M. 2453 (M.D. La. 1973). 
151. Id. at 2454. 
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The specific language of a successorship clause in a collective 
bargaining agreement may purport to bind "successors and as- 
signs" directly to the agreement, it may obligate the predecessor 
employer to require assumption of the labor contract by any suc- 
cessor before the business can be transferred, or it may combine 
both approaches. The difference in wording, however, does not 
alter a successorship clause's substantive impact. A successorship 
clause cannot bind a nonconsenting successor to the collective 
bargaining agreement unless, perhaps, the situation is covered by 
section 1127 of the California Labor Code. Instead, courts have 
applied the successorship doctrine, which has developed to cover 
all successorship situations regardless of the existence of a succes- 
sorship clause. Depending on the degree of continuity in'the work 
force and in other aspects of a predecessor's business, the succes- 
sor may have (1) a duty to arbitrate with the union under Wiley, 
(2) a duty to recognize and bargain with the union under Burns, 
or (3) no duty at all under Howard Johnson. 152 
Generally, predecessor employers who agree to include suc- 
cessorship clauses in their collective bargaining agreements must 
impose the labor contract on successors to their business or they 
will be liable for breaching the successorship clause. In practice, 
however, predecessors have been able to find ways around the 
general rule. Pursuant to hot cargo provisions of the National 
Labor Relations Act, successorship clauses will not apply to pred- 
ecessors who transfer less than their entire business. Similarly, 
predecessor employers do not breach their duty if the transfer of 
the business is involuntary and they have had no opportunity to 
make assumption of the labor contract a condition of the transfer. 
Even in cases where successorship clauses are applicable to 
predecessors, certain exceptions undercut enforceability. A 
breaching predecessor employer will be liable for damages, unless 
the court or arbirator finds a monetary award would be impracti- 
cal because the predecessor has left the industry or inadequate 
because the damage is loss of employment. A predecessor's sale 
of its business in violation of a successorship clause can be en- 
joined, unless the sale has already taken place or the court consid- 
ers such an injunction to be an unreasonable restraint on aliena- 
152. A successor employer can, of course, avoid second-guessing which strand of the 
successorship doctrine should apply by voluntarily assuming the unexpired collective 
bargaining agreement of the predecessor, thereby giving effect to a successorship clause. 
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tion. Nevertheless, the fact that the enforceability of successor- 
ship clauses against predecessors is not rejected outright as it is 
when sought against successors indicates that predecessor em- 
ployers will have a greater incentive to give effect to a successor- 
ship clause and may, therefore, insist that the successor assume 
the existing labor contract as a condition of the sale of the busi- 
ness. 
Jay D. Pirnentel 
